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damages award might be characterized as the equivalent of a corporate "death penalty.,,12 Like capital punishment in the criminal law context, the perceived need for an "ultimate punishment,,13 in the civil litigation arena has been justified as way to address the wrongful conduct of the worst of the worst. 14 This article is an attempt to examine what reasonable reforms should be made to jury discretion, particularly with regard to the jury's consideration of punitive damages. 15 My hope is to advance a process that will strike a balance between jury discretion and the valid concerns of those who perceive a need to protect against arbitrary and unfair damages verdicts. Others have also insightfully written in this area,16 but my approach builds on the structure for controlling jury discretion fashioned by the American Law Institute ("ALI") in its important work dealing with capital juries. 17 90 ("Out-of-controllawsuits are shutting down medical practices, killing businesses and costing the economy $200 billion a year."). 12 A punitive damage award of many million dollars could easily bankrupt a company and put it out of business. Id. 13 In a report on capital punishment, the American Law Institute noted:
Capital punishment constitutes only a tiny part of the criminal justice system. Fewer than 50 people were executed and slightly over 100 people were sentenced to death nationwide in 2007, while considerably over two million people remain incarcerated in the non-capital criminal justice system. The death penalty does not even constitute a substantial part of our system for punishing homicide. In a country that has experienced between 15,000 and 20,000 homicides per year nationwide over the past decade, the number of capital sentences and executions last year looks particularly trivial. The relative paucity of death sentences and executions does not disappear if we focus on the high-water marks for death-sentencing and executions in the modern era, with highs for death sentences in the 300s (per year, nationwide) and executions hovering close to 100 (per year, nationwide). THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REpORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY 44 (Apr. 15, 2009) , available at http://www.ali.orgidoc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf. 14 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) ("While some have suggested that standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate, the fact is that such standards have been developed. When the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced this problem, they concluded 'that it is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete case. ", (emphasis in original)). 15 State and federal judges already have a host a civil procedure rules that allow them to alter the size of jury awards. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391 (2005) (reviewing literature on damages). 16 David Baldus et aI., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview. with Recent Findingfrom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638 (1998) . 17 The ALI stated in its report on capital punishment:
The main provision ofthe Model Penal Code concerning capital punishment, § 210.6 . . . defines cases appropriate for capital punishment as follows: only murder, then only if there are "aggravating circumstances," and even then, not if "substantial mitigating circumstances call for leniency" or if the evidence at trial "does not foreclose all doubt respecting ... guilt." The section also proscribes the death sentence for those under age 18 at the time of the murder 636 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3 The focus of my suggested reforms will examine the drafts of the ALI's Model Penal Code that suggested reforms to the structure of how death penalty decisions are made. In an interesting, indeed ironic twist, the very model ALI statute that led to upholding the death penalty in many American jurisdictions has recently been totally rejected, with the ALI deciding that it is no longer appropriate to impose the penalty. In 2009, the ALI Council issued a position that repealed its support for the death penalty provisions it had created. I Many of its provisions were designed to separate criminal act determinations from sentencing determinations to guide the discretion of the jury.19 and for those whose "physical or mental condition calls for leniency." Section 210.6 then mandates a special sentencing procedure in capital cases and allocates sentencing authority between judge and jury. Specifically, the section lays out two formulations from which states adopting the MPC would choose. The one preferred by the Institute is for use of a jury in contested cases but with the judge retaining discretion to reject a jury verdict of death. But the section also sets forth an alternative procedure whereby the judge acts without the aid of a jury. Thus, under either procedure, final discretion to sentence a defendant to death lies with the judge. Additionally, the section requires the judge, and when aided by a jury also the jury, to consider the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances delineated in the final subsections of the section. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 2. 18 At the 2009 Annual Meeting, ALI members were asked to approve the following motion regarding the death penalty:
Id. at I.
MOTION:
That the Institute withdraws § 210.6 of the Model Penal Code.
The motion will be presented on behalf of the Council, which approved the same motion at its December 2008 meeting. In order to be the position of the Institute, the approval of a majority of the ALI members present when it is put to a vote at the Annual Meeting is required.
The Council makes one further recommendation: If a motion to endorse or oppose the abolition of capital punishment is presented for a vote at the 2009 Annual Meeting, the Council recommends that the members present vote against the motion.
To assist the members in preparing for the consideration of this matter at the 2009 Annual Meeting, the following report is being distributed in advance to the entire membership. The report provides important background information, including the history of the 1962 Model Penal Code's approach to the death penalty, a recitation of why the matter is before us in 2009, and a review of the process in which the Institute has been engaged over the past two years to arrive at this point. In Section V, we discuss some of the considerations and reasons for the Council's recommendations and decisions, including its decision not to undertake a project to revise or replace § 210.6. Section VI outlines the major concerns regarding the state of the death-penalty systems in the United States today, as set forth more fully in a paper prepared by Professor Carol Steiker and Professor Jordan Steiker at the request of ALI Director Lance Liebman. The paper is summarized in and also annexed to this report for information and not for approval.
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A. The Current Model Penal Code
When the ALI drafted the Model Penal Code in 1962, it offered no opinion on whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment:
Id.
Despite the views of the Code's Chief Reporter (and later ALI Director) Herbert Wechsler, the other Reporters, and most of the Advisers, who favored excluding the death penalty as a sanction available in the United States, the minutes of the March 1959 Council meeting report "that it is undesirable for the Institute to take a position on ... the abolition of capital punishment on the ground that this was a (l) Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder, the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is satisfied that:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3) of this Section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be established if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2) of this Section; or (b) substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at the trial, call for leniency; or (c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree; or (d) the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission ofthe crime; or (e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or (f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
(2) Determination by Court or by Court and Jury. Unless the Court imposes sentence under Subsection (1) of this Section, it shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced for a felony of the first degree or sentenced to death. The proceeding shall be conducted before the Court alone if the defendant was convicted by a Court sitting without a jury or upon his plea of guilty or if the prosecuting attorney and the defendant waive a jury with respect to sentence. In other cases it shall be conducted before the Court sitting with the jury which determined the defendant's guilt or, if the Court for good cause shown discharges that jury, with a new jury empanelled for the purpose.
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
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UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3 political question on which the opinion of either the Councilor the Institute could be of little help in settlement of the matter.,,20
The drafters of the Model Penal Code believed that if states were going to have a death penalty,21 then any decision-making process should limit the class of persons properly eligible for the punishment. 22 A primary tool that the ALI 20Id. 21 The American Law Institute made no recommendation in the 1962 Model Penal Code as to whether capital punishment should be a sentencing option:
Id. at 1-2.
Despite the views of the Code's Chief Reporter (and later ALI Director) Herbert Wechsler, the other Reporters, and most of the Advisers, who favored excluding the death penalty as a sanction available in the United States, the minutes of the March 1959 Council meeting report this conclusion: "that it is undesirable for the Institute to take a position on ... the abolition of capital punishment on the ground that this was a political question on which the opinion of either the Council or the Institute could be oflittle help in settlement of the matter." In presenting the Proposed Official Draft of the MPC at the 1962 Annual Meeting, one of the Reporters, Professor Louis Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania, said: "The Institute went through a great struggle over whether to approve or disapprove the death penalty. We finally took the course of providing the most reasonable standards and procedures for application of the death penalty for use by those jurisdictions which chose to retain it. Therefore we have bracketed the references to the death penalty, to show the contingent character of the Institute's approval of the capital punishment provisions."
22 Id. at 4. The ALI took a unique approach in determining that section 210.6 should be withdrawn:
The Program Committee's and Council's review and consultation, informed by the papers produced by the Meltzer Committee and by the Steikers and by the New Orleans conference, as well as by other sources, provide ALI with a sufficient basis to proceed with the withdrawal of § 210.6 without undertaking a traditional ALI project and to recommend that the Institute neither endorse nor oppose the abolition of capital punishment. Among the reasons that motivated many members ofthe Council are these:
A. Section 210.6 was an untested innovation in 1962. We now have decades of experience with death-penalty systems modeled on it. The section played an influential role in the evolution of American capital-punishment systems and capital-punishment law over the last half century. However, since the provision was approved by ALI, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reshaped the constitutional landscape with respect to sentencing generally and the death penalty specifically, raising questions about some aspects of § 210.6. Even though other aspects of the section-in particular, the categorical exclusion of capital punishment as a punishment for juveniles and for crimes other than murder and its doubts about it as a punishment for the mentally illproved to be prescient as confirmed in later constitutional jurisprudence, on the whole the section has not withstood the tests oftime and experience.
B. Many on the Council have concerns, convincingly described in the Steikers' paper and other sources, about the administration ofthe law of capital punishment in the United States, including the administration of death-penalty laws derived from § 210.6. A number of these concerns are outlined in Section VI, infra. Unless we are confident we can recommend procedures that would 2011]
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suggested is the process of weighing and balancing aggravating circumstances,23 those characteristics of the crime which indicate eligibility for an ultimate punishment, against mitigating circumstances/ 4 reasons that tend to reduce more severe punishment.
Although there are similarities between death penalty determinations and punitive damages determinations, I do not intend to suggest that the taking of a human life should be lightly compared to financial awards designed to deter Id. meet the most important of the concerns, the Institute should not playa further role in legitimating capital punishment, no matter how unintentionally, by retaining the section in the Model Penal Code. 23 Some questioned whether the ALI should play a different role in its handling and assessment of the death penalty:
Some Council members believe that since the death penalty will continue to be imposed in some jurisdictions in the United States, the ALI could playa useful role in recommending procedures that are consistent with current constitutional requirements. Other members, supported by the arguments in the Steikers' paper, believe that real-world constraints make it impossible for the death penalty to be administered in ways that satisfy norms of fairness and process. As ALI's current Sentencing project progresses, Director Liebman will evaluate and may recommend new projects in the area of criminal law. At this time, the Director, the Program Committee, and a large majority of the Council are not convinced that an ALI effort to offer contemporary procedures for administering a death penalty regime would succeed intellectually, institutionally within what would surely be a divided membership, and politically in terms of influence outside the Institute. Thus ALI will not undertake a project concerning the death penalty. 24 Although nearly three quarters ofthe states have the death penalty as a sentencing option, "many thoughtful and knowledgeable individuals doubt whether [these procedures] meet or are likely ever to meet basic concerns of fairness in process and outcome." Concerns include:
Id.
(a) the tension between clear statutory identification of which murders should command the death penalty and the constitutional requirement of individualized determination; (b) the difficulty of limiting the list of aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as they do in a number of state statutes now) a large percentage of murderers; ( c) the near impossibility of addressing by legal rule the conscious or unconscious racial bias within the criminal-justice system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death sentences based on the race of the victim; (d) the enormous economic costs of administering a death-penalty regime, combined with studies showing that the legal representation provided to some criminal defendants is inadequate; (e) the likelihood, especially given the availability and reliability of DNA testing, that some persons sentenced to death will later, and perhaps too late, be shown to not have committed the crime for which they were sentenced; and (t) the politicization of judicial elections, where-even though nearly all state judges perform their tasks conscientiously-candidate statements of personal views on the death penalty and incumbent judges' actions in death-penalty cases become campaign issues.
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UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3 improper business conduct. 25 Nevertheless, much can be learned from the Model Penal Code regarding structural mechanisms to control jury discretion?6 Challenging jury discretion through a more or less fixed formula can provide important guidance to both jurors and advocates in structuring litigation?7 I also will suggest that lessons learned from the Model Penal Code will provide a structural opportunity to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution tools into the litigation process even after the trial has begun?8 This may provide an opportunity for parties to resolve disputes before subjecting them 25 The Supreme Court has a long and complex history dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty:
Ten years after the MPC was promulgated, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972) (5-4), effectively invalidated traditional, discretionary systems for the imposition of capital punishment. Each of the nine Justices wrote an opinion. Two Justices thought capital punishment was per se unconstitutional. The other three Justices in the majority found the death penalty unconstitutional because of the lack of standards for determining how, among the many persons convicted of murder, the decision was made to sentence only a few to death; the resulting system, in the view of these three Justices, led to the arbitrary and/or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
By 1976, 35 states and the Congress had enacted new capital punishment laws that attempted to address the concerns expressed by the three decisive Justices in Furman. About half the states opted for mandatory death penalties-an approach that the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 1976 in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, which reasoned that contemporary standards of decency require individualized consideration of the appropriateness of a sentence of death in the particular case. The other states enacted schemes seeking to confine discretion, typically by prescribing aggravating and mitigating factors, and the majority of those states patterned their efforts, more or less closely, on MPC § 210.6. In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld statutes from Florida, Georgia, and Texas, in each case by a vote of 7-2. See Proffitt v. Florida; Gregg v Georgia; Jurek v. Texas. The Florida and Georgia statutes were patterned, more or less closely, on the MPC; Texas's statute took a quite different form, limiting capital murder to five categories of murder and putting three yes/no questions to the jury that, in the Court's judgment, adequately narrowed the reach of capital punishment while permitting consideration of mitigating evidence.
The Commentaries to section 210.6, published in 1982, stated that the Supreme Court's decisional law "amounts to a broad endorsement of the general policy reflected in the Model Code provisions."
And as a generalization, the legislative response to the 1976 decisions did tend to follow the general approach of the MPC. Today, 38 states and the federal government authorize the death penalty, and most have looked for guidance in some way to section 210.6. Id. at 13-14. 26 Again, the Institute prefers the use of a jury in contested cases, but with the judge retaining discretion to reject a jury verdict of death. Id. at 2. 27 See supra note 25. 28 There are several scholars who suggest juries do not fully understand their responsibility. 
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to consideration of punitive damages by a jury.29 Such an opportunity could avoid lengthy and costly appeals.
30
Perhaps by resolving the most troublesome concerns of critics of the civil jury trial system, other parts of the system can remain largely unaltered.
B. Implementing the Model Penal Code Approach
The great advantage of implementing the Model Penal Code approach in civil jury trials for punitive damages is that by requiring the identification of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, guidance would be given to the jury who is in effect being asked to impose a "death penalty" on a corporate defendant. For example, in the criminal death penalty context, an aggravating circumstance like "murder for hire" places society on notice that paying someone to kill another human being places one in a special category of offender that would deserve the ultimate punishment.
31
That hired killer behavior contemplates a quantity of maliciousness that exceeds other types of murderers. On the other hand, a mitigating circumstance like "no prior serious criminal violations" seems to provide a fair opportunity to demonstrate that whatever aggravating circumstance might be shown by the evidence, it should be balanced against the absence of habitual dangerous behavior. REv. 37 (1989) . 30 It has been noted that in the death penalty context:
[T]he existence of an extensive web of constitutional regulation with minimal regulatory effect stands in the way of non constitutional legislative reform of the administration of capital punishment-not only because such reform is generally extremely unpopular politically, but also because political actors and the general public assume that constitutional oversight by the federal courts is the proper locus for ensuring the fairness in capital sentencing and that the lengthy appeals process in capital cases demonstrates that the courts are doing their job (indeed, maybe even over-doing their job, considering how long cases take to get through the entire review process). THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,SUpra note 13, at 9. 31 For example, Maryland's death penalty statute contains the following provision for aggravating circumstance: "(vi) the defendant committed the murder under an agreement or contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration to commit the murder; (vii) the defendant employed or engaged another to commit the murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration." MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(I)(vi)-(vii) (LexisNexis 2010 1983) . After considering all the mitigation presented, including Smith's lack of a prior serious crime, the Court found the cumulative mitigation "significant," but not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency in light of the extreme cruelty and brutality of the crime.
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UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3 such an approach is desirable is because those aggravating and mitigating circumstances have legislative sanction. When this legislative sanction is then combined with jury discretion, it enhances the public policy to guide punishment while at the same time respects the traditional role of the jury to fix punishment. If no aggravating circumstances are found, then a case would be deemed inappropriate for punitive damages. If aggravating circumstances exist, the jury will be instructed to consider them alongside whatever mitigating circumstances exist. The legislature could also require mandatory appeals before such jury awards would become final. Such a system would also provide parties additional opportunities to explore settlement of cases before a jury's consideration of punitive damages.
C. Judging the American Jury
There is no institution made by man more controversial than the American Jury system. 33 It has been praised and hated by people from all walks of life. 34 The business community complains that it has paralyzed its ability to groW. 35 Politicians have used it as grist for their mills calling for jury reform?6 Television and movies have dramatized its workings so that people who have never actually served believe it to be a meaningless exercise. 3 ? Even in the Internet age, Web sites ridicule the work of juries in an effort to show that it is a system prone to fail. 38
In many ways this general uninformed critique of the jury has done the institution a disservice because it discounts the truly important daily work of the institution in case after case without much notice. 39 Ordinary citizens who are called on any given day in any state, federal, or county courthouse to resolve disputes of all kinds between people or entities serve a critical societal function.40 A juror's responsibilities range from deciding whether a human being should be executed for life-ending criminal conduct 41 to deciding small disputes between 33 See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 408-13 (1947) . 34 It has been noted that at the heart of the dispute over the value of the jury is the concern that "juries are incapable of adequately understanding evidence or detennining issues of fact ... [any] better than a role of dice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) . 35 neighbors. 42 With only a notice received in the mail, a carpenter, fisherman, or salesman could be sitting in judgment of a multi-national corporation; a plumber, a housewife, or a government official may be required to answer to the process of court adjudication. 43 In the most important disputes, the potential for a jury decision always plays an important role in how the dispute is resolved.
44
Although most cases that are eligible for jury determination will never result in one,45 it is the profound threat that such a determination may be necessary that drives the entire litigation system in the United States 46 and indeed, the world. 47 Still, the question of whether ordinary citizens should judge such important matters without training or experience has troubled many observers of the legal Infonnation in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 367 (1997) . All my concerns voiced in that earlier work remain, but the use of such information has been ruled constitutional. However, I am at a loss to reconcile how it might violate Due Process to put a company out of business by the use of broad victim information but does not offend Due Process to end a life by using similar information of victim harm. 42 At an earlier time in my legal career I was counsel in a three-day jury trial that involved a fist fight between feuding neighbors that began over, among other things, a parking dispute. The loser of the fistfight sought civil damages in his lawsuit. I represented the winner of the fight who had already been convicted of simple assault in criminal court and received a minimal sentence that did not involve incarceration. After a short deliberation the jury found that the defendant had committed the assault but awarded no damages. The trial judge, a veteran of many decades of jury trials, had urged the plaintiffs to accept our settlement offer in chambers before jury selection, essentially stating, "I see these cases all the time and the jury is going to give you about one dollar, they do not like losing time from work or their families to give money to neighbors who cannot get along even if they are clear who started the fight." Interviews with members of the jury after the verdict confirmed the judge's comments in chambers. 43 Even a failure to report could lead to a citation for contempt or incarceration. An interesting newspaper story reported:
Like two schoolboys ordered to stay after class, Donald Carstens and Athanasios Katsoulis sat fidgeting in a Baltimore courtroom yesterday, watching the clock and waiting until they could go home. They were lectured, scolded about their behavior and ordered to remain in a paneled, windowless circuit courtroom until 5 p.m. after Judge Edward J. Angeletti held them in contempt as part of a crackdown on those who fail to appear for jury duty. 463, 464 (1991) . 46 The United States litigation system has been described as cumbersome and expensive. See Lasson, supra note 36, at 755. 47 Several international writers have attacked the efficiency of the American litigation system. Our Constitution, which has been the envy of many nations forming democracy, holds in high regard the right to a jury trial. James Madison was reported to have described it as among the "most valuable rights" in the Bill of Rights. RUTLAND, supra note 39. [Vol. 79:3 system. 48 Intense debate surrounds 49 concerns over whether juries are even capable of understanding the instructions on the law they are routinely given,50 warnings not to discuss the case until all the evidence is received,5! and complex expert testimony.
Certainly there are other ways to resolve disputes rather than submitting disputes to the trial by jury. The long-abandoned methods of combat,52 strange ordeals,53 and other more mystical forms of proof have all been used and have failed the test of time. 54 However, our current system of jury trial has been criticized as bearing too much resemblance to a trial by combat, with lawyers who use "scorched earth" tactics in a win-at-all-costs approach. 55 Some believe that a jury trial is more theater than law, concluding that decisions ultimately are votes for the best lawyer rather than the reasoned examination of the facts and the law. 56 These concerns have prompted some bar association disciplinary committees to more tightly control how lawyers may conduct themselves during the news coverage of high profile trials. 50 There is considerable concern whether jurors listen to the instructions they are given. One scholar has called into question whether death penalty jurors understand instructions given to them by a trial judge, especially when they ask questions seeking clarification. Stephen P. Garvey et aI., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 627,628 (2000) . 51 Jurors are not permitted to talk about a case while they are in the process of deciding it:
The courts have recognized that the exposure of jurors to news media reports during trial has been a "very real problem for a long time. " State v. Jones, 50 N.C. App. 263, 268 (1981 jury pools and even actual sitting jurors will be influenced by statements made to the media. 58 This is true in spite of the fact that judges frequently instruct jurors to disregard media reports regarding the case. 59 These problems, combined with the longstanding skepticism about lawyers,6o have encouraged reformers to examine the jury trial and how it should be conducted.
Despite its detractors, many believe that the jury is the essence of our democracy, demonstrating our commitment to a decentralized process through citizen involvement in decision-making. 61 Although praised for its democratic character, it is often called too unpredictable to be reliable. 62 The sometimes inexplicable results of jury trials have led some critics to conclude that jurors are simply getting "dumber.,,63 Many countries have largely dispensed with its use.
64
Others, like Great Britain, where the jury trial was born, while not eliminating it, have drastically altered the control oflawyers selecting those who will serve. 65
The process of selecting jurors has been the source of much frustration as of late. 66 The controversial concept of the peremptory challenge 67 has inflamed [But] In both of these trials, the jury acquittal resulted in calls from segments of society to control juries, particularly those including black jurors, from too easily acquitting black defendants. 79 The notion that black jurors would favor black defendants has become known as "racial jury nullification.,,80 It contemplates that in some cases jurors would ignore the facts and the law and decide the case on racial considerations alone. 81
The idea that juries would ignore the facts and the law in order to acquit is a longstanding exercise of jury power that dates to the foundation of our Still many argue that such power should not be used to address perceived racism in the criminal justice system where statistical disproportion of all kind exists in the prosecution of African Americans. 9o Some commentators have gone so far to suggest that proposals encouraging black jurors to engage in such conduct are "foolish and dangerous.,,91
It is unavoidable that jurors will sometimes act in race-conscious ways,92 and race alone is an improper basis on which to engage in nullification of the law or the facts. However, when race becomes entangled with questionable political considerations,93 racial motivation of prosecuting officials,94 or prosecutorial excess and abuse of discretion,95 a jury may reach the conclusion that it will not participate in furthering the unfairness in the case even though the facts suggest guilt.
96
A jury, properly selected from the peers of the community, should be the last word before someone loses their liberty in a free society.97 Recently, lawyers have been going to great expense to develop techniques they believe will lead them to predict what a jury is likely to do when it deliberates a case. The Supreme Court has complicated this area of the law, making it unclear whether jury selection consultants are in any way prohibited from helping lawyers select juries by using race and gender bases demographic data. 104
Some modifications are obviously needed, but examining which reforms make the most sense requires some restraint in proposing change. 105
D. The Model Penal Code and Control of Jury Discretion
In an effort to control juries in the death penalty process from making arbitrary decisions, the American Law Institute made several proposals at its May 1959 meeting in the form of tentative drafts. 106 The Institute took no position on the appropriateness of the death penalty.107 Instead, it recognized that the death penalty ranked high among issues of public controversy in the criminal law.108 The drafters explained:
[T]he reporters favored abolition of the capital sanction. The Advisory Committee recommended by a vote of 17-3 that the Institute express itself upon the issue, of retention or abolition but substantially united in the view that the institute could not be influential in its resolution and therefore should not take a position either way. 109
The drafters believed that "it was clear that many jurisdictions would retain the sentence of death for some form of murder for many years .... "lIO This illustrated their belief that it was essential that the Institute address at least two problems. " [F] 
2011]
JURY DISCRETION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 649
The wisdom in the Institute's judgment on this point cannot be overstated. Because of the philosophical differences that abound regarding capital punishment,112 the legal processes by which it might be imposed are varied.
113 The detail of the procedural framework for controlling juror discretion reflects the potentially harsh consequences that the Institute perceived from an unguided jury making such a serious decision. 114
In order to make it clear that the attempt to develop a suitable decisionmaking framework for capital decisions would not be misunderstood, the Institute emphasized its cautionary tone: "It bears repeating, however, that inclusion of this provision in the Model Code does not signal Institute endorsement of capital punishment, nor does the optional authorization of this penalty under the statute reflect an Institute decision in favor of abolition. ,,115
The first level of protection, that of the identification of aggravating circumstances, contemplates a need for legislative determinations about what crimes and circumstances should be considered the worst of the worst in order to impose the ultimate penalty.1l6 Requiring a jury to make findings of the existence of these circumstances prior to being permitted to move on to the question of whether death should be imposed is a reasonable control over decision-making discretion. I 17
The constitutional violations that occurred are particularly egregious because they involve fundamental protections that were contemplated by the Supreme Court in its early post-Furman v. Georgia l18 capital punishment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has reminded us that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.,,119
In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia capital punishment statute was not unconstitutional because, among other things, it provided adequate procedural safeguards to prevent the jury from considering issues in a manner that was not unfairly prejudicial to the accused. 120 The court pointed out that "bifurcation" of the capital sentencing hearing was the primary safeguard needed to prevent the jury from misusing the information they had been given. 
UMKC LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 79:3 particularly prejudicial because that jury heard evidence about the impact of the crime on the victims before any evidence was presented, or findings made, about the perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime. 122 The Supreme Court has never contemplated that a constitutional sentencing procedure could occur in the complete absence of the procedural protection that is supplied by bifurcation. "Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the state is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees.,,123
The procedural protection lost at the resentencing because of the highly unusual order of proof, permitted the jury to consider the evidence in a manner likely to produce a decision that was "wanton [,] " "freakish" and as arbitrary as being "stuck by lightening [.] "124 The Supreme Court has required that any decision to impose the death penalty be based on reason rather than emotion or caprice. 125 The standard for assessing the constitutional violation is not reduced because the proceedings at issue are a resentencing trial. As the Supreme Court has clearly recognized, "fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force to the penalty phase of a capital case than they do in the guiltdetermining phase of any criminal trial.,,126 It is certainly possible that the resentencing jurors, relying only on the prior findings of guilt by another jury and the emotional content of victim impact testimony, will render a death sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that a death sentence must be vacated if it is possible that the jury may have improperly delegated some of the responsibility for rendering the death sentence to another part of the criminal justice system. 127 The resentencing jury, already aware that the petitioner was convicted of committing a capital crime, should have made the factual determination that the petitioner was a principal to the crime before assessing the other emotionally-charged evidence in the case. Otherwise, they would be tempted to rely too heavily on the work of the prior jury.
The Supreme Court further never contemplated that in a resentencing a jury be permitted to issue a death decision with adequate guidance from the sentencing judge and sentencing forms. 128
The petitioner is entitled to have his sentence set by a jury that is properly instructed. 129 There can be no presumption that the jury understood the charge in a constitutional manner when there "exists the reasonable possibility 122/d. 123 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) . 124 See Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-310 (1972) . 125 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) . 126 Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978 The specter of punitive damages awards in civil litigation is among the most controversial areas in all of American law.!3! The possibility that they may be awarded lurks a constant threat to American business.132 The potential that one day punitive damages may not be available has been seen as the denial of a critical right of the injured and the loss of a necessary deterrent to extreme misconduct. 133 
II. TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY THE SUPREME COURT: PHILIP MORRIS V. WILLIAMS AND EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY V. BAKER
[T]he generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear rather than reverence, and to refrain from evil rather because of the punishment that it brings than because of its own foulness. Aristotle 134
A. Background
Arousing much criticism and discussion, punitive damages are a civil remedy whose purpose sprouts from the same seed as criminal punishment. !35 130 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.8 (1985) . 131 The constitutionality of punitive damages has been both validated and invalidated in different Lawsuits shine light into dark corners, exposing corporate wrongdoing or shortcuts that have placed citizens at risk. Indeed it may be the exposure function that matters most, even more than money judgments. But of course money matters too, providing incentives for businesses and health care providers to [md ways to reduce injuries.
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Punitive damages or exemplary damages are often viewed as society's "moral condemnation" of a civil defendant's misconduct and are expressed by imposing a monetary penalty on the defendant in order to punish and deter. 136 In particular, punitive damages are not awarded to "redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct," but rather are awarded to a plaintiff in a tort case, in addition to compensatory damages, when the defendant's action was reckless or malicious. 137 The imposition of punitive awards is not a modem-day innovation, but is traceable to the Code of Hammurabi.
138
In early American jurisprudence, cases imposing punitive damages, or damages in excess of actual injury to the plaintiff, took the position that punitive damages were administered both to penalize the defendant and to compensate the plaintiff for intangible wrongs.
139 By the 1850s American courts 
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pronounced that punitive damages were predominately aimed at punishment, and not compensation. 140
In addition to the trail of history that has led to the present day status of punitive damages, it is important to note that states, as entities separate from the federal government, may exercise significant discretion in determining how and when to impose punitive damages in order to further their "legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.,,141 Although the scope of this Article does not encompass the variation of punitive damage regimes among states, it is worthwhile to illuminate that state regulation of punitive damages and the procedure by which punitive damages may be awarded is far from uniform. 142 For example, Nebraska prohibits punitive damages altogether while four other states only allow punitive damages when sanctioned by state statute. 143 Other states limit the awarding of punitive damages by imposing monetary caps.l44 For states that allow punitive awards, the amount is generally first calculated by a jury and then "reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable.,,145
Diverse state approaches to punitive damages should not be misguiding, for the discretion is not unlimited, but must be exercised within the confines of 140 See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (explaining that punitive or exemplary damages are awarded based upon the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct in order to punish rather than compensate); SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 136, at 16 (summarizing the current status of punitive damages in America). In addition, the transition of punitive damages to a noncompensatory function is suggested to be a result of the broadening of injuries considered compensatory overtime. See Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437 n.ll (2001) . 141 BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107 , 1112 (Mass. 1991 (stating that punitive damages are prohibited unless expressly authorized by statute); Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989 ) (holding that punitive damages prohibited under Nebraska Constitution); Fisher Properties, Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986) Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (noting that generally jury instructions provide juries with wide latitude in designating the amount of a punitive award).
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[Vol. 79:3 the United States Constitution. '46 The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages exceed the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the amount is grossly excessive or arbitrarily determined. '47 Punitive damages that reach the point of arbitrariness are reasoned to violate the principle of fairness and notice guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 148 In other terms, a person is constitutionally entitled to fair notice of the severity of the punishment that a state may impose, and obtaining fair notice is unachievable when a civil penalty is so extraordinarily exorbitant when compared to the interests it is alleged to further.
149 Moreover, when punitive damages are deemed grossly excessive, the Court has concluded their award no longer furthers any legitimate state purpose and constitutes "an arbitrary deprivation of property" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. '5o
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court in a five-tofour decision outlined "three guideposts" to be utilized by reviewing courts to determine whether a punitive damage award is grossly excessive and consequently unconstitutionally denied the defendant fair notice.
' (1996) . The BMW case arose after an Alabama jury found BMW liable to Dr. Ira Gore for $4000 in compensatory damages and four million dollars in punitive damages. Id at 562-65. The jury found BMW, an automobile distributor, liable for fraud based upon its nationwide policy of not disclosing damages that occurred to its new cars prior to delivery when the cost of repair did not exceed three percent of the suggested retail price. Id. at 562. The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the amount of punitive damages to two million dollars based upon its finding that the jury improperly calculated the punitive award by multiplying Dr. Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other states. Id at 567. The guideposts consist of the reprehensibility of the defendant's unlawful conduct, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage amount, and the difference between the damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in similar cases. 152 Reprehensibility is considered to be the pivotal indication of whether a punitive award is grossly excessive. 153 Yet, a state cannot impose punitive damages in order to punish a defendant for conduct that lawfully occurred outside of the state's jurisdiction. 154 In regard to the second guidepost, the Court has not imposed an absolute constitutional limit on the ratio between the amount of compensatory damages and the punitive sum, but has reflected that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.,,155 In addition, a Supreme Court held that the two million dollar punitive award was grossly excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 585. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that states maintain diverse approaches to what automobile distributors are required to disclose in regard to car damage prior to sale. Id. at 569. The Court found that Alabama could not impose punitive damages on BMW in order to deter or punish its conduct that was lawful in other states. Id. at 572. In light of this rule, the Court applied the three guideposts only as they related to the interests of Alabama consumers, not the entire nation. Id. at 574. In other words, the reprehensibility of BMW's conduct did not include an evaluation of BMW's non-disclosure policy in other states. See id. at 574-80. 152Id. at 574-75. One commentator criticizes the Supreme Court's guideposts set forth in BMW because, despite the achievement of "systematically reduc[ing] some of the highest awards," there was no success in remedying the unfairness of punitive awards among similarly situated defendants and the unpredictability of the size of the award. See Developments in the Law, supra note 135, at 1788-89. 153 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572. When determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, courts are to consider:
[Whether] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evidenced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. In State Farm, the Court explained that the defendant should only be held accountable for punitive damages if after the imposition of compensatory damages, the defendant's blameworthiness is "so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence." Id. at 419. 154 BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572, 575; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421. As explained, a jury must be instructed not to utilize evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish the defendant for conduct that was legal in the jurisdiction where it took place. BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572-73 (referring to BMW's nationwide non-disclosure policy). Moreover, in State Farm the Court reasoned that a state may not impose punitive damages to punish and deter actions of the defendant that were unrelated to the plaintiff's actual harm. 538 U.S. at 422. Specifically, the Court stated that the reprehensibility guidepost may not be used by courts to allow a defendant to be punished for all possible wrongdoing committed against anyone when such acts are dissimilar to the conduct shown to harm the plaintiff. Eleven years after the Supreme Court guaranteed fair notice to civil defendants by eliminating grossly excessive punitive awards, the Court faced the question of exactly for whose injury a jury may punish the defendant under the Constitution. Set against the backdrop of a widow's legal battle against a cigarette company for the smoking-related death of her husband, the Supreme Court held in Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams that it is unconstitutional for a jury to take into account its "desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties do not represent)" when calculating a punitive damage award because this constitutes a taking of property from the defendant without due process oflaw.157
The Philip Morris case arose when Mayola Williams brought suit against Philip Morris, at the time the largest manufacturer of cigarettes in the United States, alleging negligence and fraud, and seeking compensation and punitive damages for her husband's death. ISS 824, 828 (Or. 2002) . The Oregon Court of Appeals summarized the evidence regarding the defendant's advertising campaign as follows:
[T]he industry established its strategy and began developing its public image in response to a decline in cigarette sales in 1953 that was the apparent result of studies that showed that cigarette tar could cause cancer in mice and that established the existence of statistical correlations between smoking and lung cancer .... Between 1954 and the I 990s, [research organizations created by Phillip Morris and other companies] developed and promoted an extensive campaign to counter the effects of negative scientific information on cigarette sales. The individual tobacco companies, including [Philip Morris], were part of the organizations and acted in cooperation with them. At first, the industry publicly denied that there was a problem; for example, in the 1950s and early 1960s, [Philip Morris'] officials told the public that [Philip Morris] would "stop business tomorrow" if it believed that its products were harmful. For most of that period, however, the industry did not attempt to refute the scientific information directly; rather, it tried to find ways to create doubts about it. The industry's goal was to create the impression that scientists disagreed about whether cigarette smoking was dangerous, that the industry was vigorously conducting research into the issue, and that a definitive answer would not be possible until that research was complete. As one of [Philip Morris'] vicepresidents explained in an internal memo, the purpose was to give smokers a psychological crutch and a self-rationale that would encourage them to continue smoking ....
[Philip Morris'] director of research in the late 1970s and 1980s explained to a subordinate that his job was to attack outside research that was inconsistent with the industry's position by casting doubt on it. ... Morris liable and awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages on the fraud claim, which was found to be grossly excessive by the trial court and reduced to thirtytwo million dollars. 159 Philip Morris argued that the jury's award was unconstitutional because it was issued in part to punish it for harm to victims other than the plaintiff. 160 This argument mainly centered around the trial court's refusal to give Philip Morris' proposed jury instruction No. 34, which specifically told the jury it could not issue punitive damages to punish Philip At least by the 1970s, there was absolutely no scientific basis for denying the connection between cigarette smoking and cancer and other diseases. However, [Philip Morris] continued to assert that the hazard of cigarette smoking to health was uncertain when it actually knew that there was no legitimate controversy about that subject. A., Inc., 127 P.3d 1165 , 1167 -68 (Or. 2006 . The Supreme Court then granted certiorari for a second time, but only discussed the Constitution's "procedural limitations" surrounding the use of punitive damages to punish a defendant for injury to nonparties, and did not address whether the punitive award in the particular case was grossly excessive. Philip Morris U.S. A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) . The Court explained that prior cases did not expressly state a jury may not issue punitive damages in order to punish the defendant for harm to nonparties and as a result the Oregon Supreme Court applied an incorrect constitutional standard when reviewing Philip Morris' appeal. [d. at 356-57. Due to the possibility that applying the standard set forth by the Court may call for a new trial or change in the amount of punitive damages, the Court did not evaluate whether the award was grossly excessive in violation of the Constitution. 
